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DIVORCE-CUSTODY DISPOSITIONS: THE
CHILD'S WISHES IN PERSPECTIVE
Lawrence A. Moskowitz*
INTRODUCTION
In this country, a significant number of marriages ending
in divorce involve families with minor children.' Frequently,
these proceedings are aggravated by child custody disputes.
Resolution of such a dispute has a profound impact on a child's
future, since it determines where he2 lives and goes to school,
the conditions of his upbringing, and the quality and nature of
the training and guidance he is to receive. 3
Since the child is so extensively affected by such proceed-
ings, the child's wishes in determining his future become a very
important consideration, perhaps, in some cases, determina-
tive. At the same time, it must be recognized that a child in a
custody dispute is vulnerable to psychological pressures which
in themselves might be quite harmful and which may also
cause him to reach a decision that is not in his best interests.,
The child's "right" or "need" to be heard, as will become evi-
dent, is balanced by an equally compelling need for emotional
protection, which can best be achieved by keeping the child as
far away from what one child psychologist has termed "the
combat zone." 5
This article will identify and discuss the various compet-
ing interests at stake in a custody proceeding, and will examine
several historical methods of handling custody disputes.' Fol-
* B.A., 1974, University of California at Santa Cruz; J.D., 1977, Boalt Hall School
of Law, University of California at Berkeley; member, State Bar of California.
1. M. WHEELER, No-FAULT DIVORCE 72 (1974).
2. The male pronoun is used for convenience only. Its use represents an arbitrary
choice and is not intended to indicate that only males are under discussion herein.
3. Hansen, Guardians ad litem in Divorce and Custody Cases: Protection of the
Child's Interests, 4 J. FAM. L. 181 (1964). See also Berdon, A Child's Right to Counsel
in a Contested Custody Proceeding Resulting from a Termination of the Marriage, 50
CONN. B.J. 150 (1976); Levin, Guardians ad litem in a Family Court, 34 MD. L. REV.
341 (1974); Comment, A Child's Due Process Right to Counsel in Divorce Custody
Proceedings, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 917 (1976).
4. Comment, The Role of the Child's Wishes in California Custody Prcceedings,
6 U.C.D. L. REV. 332, 345 (1973).
5. See note 50 infra.
6. For a good discussion and identification of various strands of custody law, see
Bodenheimer, The Multiplicity of Child Custody Proceedings-Problems of California
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lowing this examination, it proposes some considerations that
should play a role in the resolution of future custody disputes.
Based on these considerations, the article exposes the inherent
weaknesses of the current approaches to custody disputes and
proposes a model statute as a workable framework for solving
them.
HISTORICAL RESOLUTIONS OF CUSTODY DISPUTES
The Paternal Presumption
At English common law, when a custody contest devel-
oped over a child, the father was prima facie entitled to custody
unless he was found physically or mentally unfit. This nearly
absolute preference was considered the reciprocal right of the
father's duty of child support, and was based in part on a belief
in the "strength" and "potency" of the father-child relation-
ship.' In addition, the rule was a manifestation of the father's
complete control over his children in all respects.8 In sum, the
rule precluded judicial consideration of the wishes or welfare of
the child unless an aggrieved party other than the child chal-
lenged the father's right to custody on the grounds of physical
or mental incapacity.
American courts did not apply the paternal preference so
strictly. Some courts utilized a fault standard, based on the
theory that a person who was not conducting himself properly
would not make a good custodial parent.' While the apparent
rationale for this standard was "the good of the child,"' 0 it
failed to consider the child's wishes.
The "Best Interests" Standard
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
Law, 23 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1971); Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial
Functions in the Face of Indeterminancy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROS. 226 (1976).
7. Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650, 652 (1881). While the Chapsky court recog-
nized the common law rule, it was in this case that the now-familiar "best interests"
standard was first articulated. See note 11 infra.
8. M. WHEELER, supra note 1, at 75. The father even possessed the right to sell
his children.
9. The proposition is generally true, that one who has conducted
either well or ill in a particular domestic relation, will conduct the same
in another; and so, as a general practice, the courts give the custody to
the innocent party; because, with such party, the children will be more
likely to be cared for properly.
2 BISHOP ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 532 (4th ed. 1864).
10. Id. §§ 529, 532.
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the paternal preference and fault standards were gradually're-
placed by a rule favoring the "best interests of the child." In
Chapsky v. Wood, " the court made the child's welfare the con-
trolling factor. Thus, it concluded that "a parent's right to the
custody of a child is not like the right of property, an absolute
and uncontrollable right." Similarly, the court in Finlay v.
Finlay invoked the state's parens patriae power, authorizing
judges to generally "do what is best for the interests of the
child.""2
The oft-stated rationale for the "best interests" standard,
as the opinion in Chapsky suggests, is that children are
"intelligent moral beings," and therefore their happiness and
welfare are matters of "primary consideration."' 3 Since this
standard is still used in most American jurisdictions, it is the
starting point for an examination of divorce-custody law.
While the courts began to protect the child's interests,
they frequently accorded little or no weight to the child's ex-
press wishes. Rather, they took it upon themselves to deter-
mine what was in the child's best interests. 4 Though the child's
wishes were a proper subject of inquiry, 5 their influence was
minimized by this exercise of judicial discretion and limited by
11. 26 Kan. 650 (1881). In Chapsky, a father brought a habeas corpus action in
an effort to obtain custody of his ten-year-old daughter, who in early infancy had been
given by her parents to her aunt, Mrs. Wood. By the time of this action the mother
had died; thus the struggle for custody involved the aunt and father only. The Kansas
Supreme Court rejected the common law preference in favor of the father and the
natural parent, and concluded that the child would simply be better off remaining with
her aunt. In so doing, the court used language which has been echoed for almost a
century: "Above all things, the paramount consideration is, what will promote the
welfare of the child?" Id. at 654.
12. 240 N.Y. 429, 433, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925).
13. 2 NELSON ON DIvoRcE AND ANNULMENT 166 (2d ed. 1945). See also Chapsky v.
Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881).
14. Berkshire v. Caley, 157 Ind. 1, 60 N.E. 696 (1901). In Berkshire the court
agreed that the custodians chosen by the child (namely, her maternal grandmother,
aunt and uncle) would promote her welfare more effectively than her father, who had
brought a habeas corpus action against the maternal relatives. But here the court made
clear what had been implicit in Neville v. Reed, 134 Ala. 317, 32 So. 659 (1901), i.e.,
that the child's wishes, when considered, were at best mere evidence of his "best
interests" which could guide, but never control, the trial judge's decision as to custody.
15. Neville v. Reed, 134 Ala. 317, 32 So. 659 (1901). In Neville, the father sought
to obtain custody of his fourteen-year-old son, who had been awarded to his mother
when the parents were divorced. The trial court applied the "best interests" standard
after asking the boy which parent he preferred; the boy chose his mother. The father's
petition was denied, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. It is clear that the
"best interests" test was applied at both levels. Therefore, the Supreme Court's regard
for the child's wishes must be considered mere dictum.
1978]
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various age presumptions and capacity to reason require-
ments. 6
The Maternal Presumption
Eventually, the acceptance and application of the "best
interests" standard evolved into a presumption favoring the
mother in custody disputes. This rule was apparently based on
a general assumption that children would be better off with
their mothers. 7 Until 1970, California maintained a statutory
maternal preference when the children were of "tender
years.""' Like the paternal presumption, any successful chal-
lenge to the right to custody required a showing that the fa-
vored spouse was unfit. Additionally, as with the "best inter-
ests" standard, the presumption operated to minimize the
weight given to the child's express wishes.
16. For example, former CAL. Civ. CODE § 138 (Deering 1965) provided:
In actions for divorce or for separate maintenance the court may, during
the pendency of the action, or at the final hearing or at any time there-
after during the minority of any of the children of the marriage, make
such order for the custody of such minor children as may seem necessary
or proper, and may at any time modify or vacate the same. In awarding
the custody the court is to be guided by the following considerations:
(1) By what appears to be for the best interests of the child; and
if the child is of a sufficient age to form an intelligent preference,
the court may consider that preference in determining the question
The same requirement of "sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an
intelligent preference" is contained in CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West 1976), California's
present custody statute.
17. One court expressed it as follows: "There is but a twilight zone between a
mother's love and the atmosphere of heaven, and all things being equal, no child
should be deprived of that maternal influence unless there are special and extraordi-
nary reasons for so doing." Tuter v. Tuter, 120 S.W. 2d 203, 205 (Mo. 1938). See also
2 NELSON ON DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT, supra note 13 at 175.
18. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 138 (Deering 1965), which provided:
[I]n awarding the custody the court is to be guided by the following
considerations ... (2) As between parents adversely claiming the custody,
neither parent is entitled to it as of right; but other things being equal, if
the child is of tender years, custody should be given to the mother ....
But see CAL. Civ. CODE § 4600(a) (West 1976), which provides that custody should be
awarded "to either parent according to the best interests of the child." Applying the
earlier provision, the California Court of Appeal stated: "It is not open to question,
and indeed it is universally recognized, that the mother is the natural custodian of her
young. This view proceeds on the well known fact that there is no satisfactory substi-
tute for a mother's love." Washburn v. Washburn, 49 Cal. App. 2d 581, 588, 122 P.2d
96, 100 (1942).
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Guardianship Statutes
Although guardianship statutes rarely apply directly to
divorce-custody cases, they may, nevertheless, bear on the role
of the child's wishes. In many states such statutes allow a child
above a certain age to nominate his own guardian. Thus, some
courts have utilized the age specified in the guardianship stat-
ute to establish the point at which the child's express wishes
will control in a divorce-custody dispute. 9 In support of this
position, these courts simply point out that the intent of a
guardianship statute is to give consideration to the wishes of
children above the specified age and that this legislative deter-
mination should have weight in custody proceedings. 0
California's statute makes fourteen the "age of discre-
tion," and courts generally give considerable weight to the
wishes of children above that age.' The only limitations placed
on the older child's choice are court inquiries into whether the
appointment is "necessary and convenient" and whether the
child's nominee is fit.
The Child's Choice
Ohio has experimented with rules making the express
wishes of the children controlling in some custody disputes.
Former section 8033 of the Ohio General Code provided that
a child above the age of ten had the right to choose whom he
preferred to live with, as long as that parent was a fit custo-
dian. Only "moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, or in-
capacity" constituted unfitness under the original statute.
22
19. See, e.g., Vilas v. Vilas, 184 Ark. 352, 42 S.W.2d 379 (1931).
20. Id.
21. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1406 (West 1972) provides:
In appointing a general guardian for a minor, the court is to be guided
by what appears to be for the best interest of the child in respect to its
temporal and mental and moral welfare; and if the child is of sufficient
age to form an intelligent preference, the court may consider that prefer-
ence in determining the question. If the child resides in this state and is
over fourteen years of age, he may nominate his own guardian, either of
his own accord or within ten days after being duly cited by the court; and
such nominee must be appointed if approved by the court. When a guard-
ian has been appointed for a minor under fourteen years of age, the minor,
at any time after he attains that age, may nominate his own guardian,
subject to the approval of the court.
22. OfHo REv. CODE ANN. § 8033 (Throckmorton 1940) provides:
Upon hearing the testimony of either or both of [the] parents, corrobor-
ated by other proof, the court shall decide which one of them shall have
the care, custody and control of such offspring, taking into account that
1978]
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This resulted in continuing litigation over the meaning and
application of the fitness requirement.
For example, in Godbey v. Godbey23 an Ohio appellate
court concluded that the trial court must first examine the
fitness of each parent before the child could choose. One year
later, another appellate court held that a child's choice must
be respected unless the selected parent was found to be unfit,
strongly implying that the choice could be made prior to the
determination of fitness. 24 The Ohio Supreme Court did not
expressly resolve the disagreement among the lower courts, al-
though in dicta it appeared to disapprove the Godbey ap-
proach.25
At this point, the legislature took over. In 1946, it replaced
section 8033 with section 3109.04 which broadened the meaning
of "unfit" by deleting the narrow definition contained in the
prior section. Additionally, the 1946 revision raised the age of
discretion from ten to fourteen."
Currently, Ohio law provides that children twelve years
and older are entitled to state a parental preference, and chil-
dren eleven years and older are allowed to have their wishes
which would be for their best interests, except that, if such children be
ten years of age or more, they must be allowed to choose which parent
they prefer to live with, unless the parent so selected, by reason of moral
depravity, habitual drunkenness or incapacity, be unfitted to take charge
of such children in which case the court shall determine their custodian.
23. 70 Ohio App. 450, 44 N.E.2d 810 (1942). See also Schwalenberg v. Schwalen-
berg, 65 Ohio App. 217, 29 N.E. 2d 617 (1940).
24. See Rauth v. Rauth, 73 Ohio App. 564, 57 N.E.2d 266 (1943).
25. In Dailey v. Dailey, 146 Ohio St. 93, 64 N.E.2d 246 (1945), the court said:
"This provision [§ 8033] . . . is mandatory in respect to the choice by the child, but
with the exception that where the parent selected in the exercise of such a choice is
unfitted by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, or incapacity, the court
has power to fix the custody." 146 Ohio St. at 94, 64 N.E.2d at 247. This interpretation
suggests that the fitness exception was not to become applicable until after the child
had stated his preference, as the appellate court had held in Rauth.
26. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (Page 1951) provided:
Upon hearing the testimony of either or both parents, corroborated by
other proof, the court shall decide which of them shall have the care,
custody, and control of the offspring, taking into account that which
would be for their best interest, except that if any child is fourteen years
of age or more, it may be allowed to choose which parent it prefers to live
with, unless the parent so selected is unfitted to take charge.
The effect of the new unfitness provision-that is to say, the lack of a specific one-was
apparent in Watson v. Watson, 76 Ohio L. Abs. 348, 146 N.E.2d 443 (1956), in which
the trial court held that the mother's having committed adultery rendered her unfit
and refused to give effect to the fourteen-year-old child's choice of her mother. The
appellate court affirmed.
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considered. 7 The wishes of children under eleven are com-
pletely subject to the court's discretion.
Utah enacted a statute similar to Ohio's in some respects,
and experienced like difficulties. Utah's statute originally pro-
vided that children ten and older who were of sound mind could
choose their custodial parent." The choice was not subject to
a parental fitness requirement. In Smith v. Smith,2" the Utah
Supreme Court upheld the choice of a child who was over the
age of ten. The various opinions in the Smith decision are
27. Otuo Rav. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (Page Supp. 1976) provides:
Upon hearing the testimony of either or both parents the court shall
decide which of them shall have the care, custody, and control of the
offspring, taking into account that which would be for their best interest,
except that any child twelve years of age or more may be allowed to
choose the parent with whom the child is to live unless the court finds
that the parent so selected is unfitted to take charge or unless the court
finds, with respect to a child twelve years of age or older, that it would
not be in the best interests of the child to have choice ... (C) In determin-
ing the best interests of a child pursuant to this section, whether on an
original award of custody or modification of custody, the court shall con-
sider all relevant factors, including: (1) The wishes of the child's parents
regarding custody; (2) The wishes of the child regarding his custody if he
is eleven years of age or older; (3) The child's interaction and interrela-
tionship with his parents, siblings, and any other person who may signifi-
cantly affect the child's best interests; (4) The child's adjustment to his
home, school, and community; (5) The mental and physical health of all
persons involved in the situation.
At this point it is appropriate to point out that, given the basic dilemma described
in the Introduction, Ohio's present solution reflects the worst of both alternatives. It
forces children to take a stand, with all the attendant emotional problems posed
thereby, without really giving them much of a say-so regarding the ultimate determi-
nation.
GA. CODE ANN. § 30-127 (1976) allows children fourteen and over to choose their
custodian subject to a fitness requirement similar to Ohio's. The Georgia cases suggest
that, as in Ohio, a child coming within the statutory age provision may choose his
custodian, but the court may ultimately give or deny effect to such a choice using the
"best interests" standard. See, e.g., Hardy v. Hardee, 225 Ga. 585, 170 S.E.2d 417
(1968) (child's choice given effect, court saying that giving effect to child's choice is
tantamount to finding that chosen parent is fit); Pritchett v. Pritchett, 219 Ga. 635,
135 S.E.2d 417 (1964) (child's choice denied effect since chosen parent found to be
unfit). Like the present Ohio statute, the Georgia statute appears to be a "best inter-
ests" rule in a slightly varied form.
28. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1953) provided:
When a decree of divorce is made the court may make such orders in
relation to the children, property and parties, and the maintenance of the
parties and children, as may be equitable; provided, that if any of the
children have attained the age of ten years and are of sound mind, such
children shall have the privilege of selecting the parent to which they will
attach themselves. Such subsequent changes or new orders may be made
by the court with respect to the disposal of the children or the distribution
of property as shall be reasonable and proper.
29. 15 Utah 2d 36, 386 P.2d 900 (1963).
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highly illustrative of the difficulties surrounding the applica-
tion of the "child's choice" standard in custody disputes.
Justice Crockett, in his dissent, argued that the judgment
of children, even those over ten, is likely to be based on whim,
and is therefore suspect. He further pointed out that requiring
the child to choose between his parents makes him subject to
mind-poisoning, coercion, and "ill-advised gifts or favors."
Finally, he noted that the choice involves the entire family and
therefore should not be left to the child alone. 0
Conversely, Chief Justice Henriod, in his majority opinion,
contended that children over ten have "pretty good sense." He
argued that the parents alone were the "homebreakers" and
responsible for the divorce. Finally, he maintained that chil-
dren "invariably" suffer to a greater extent during divorces
than do their parents, so at the very least they should be able
to make the important determination concerning their future
and "make pawns, for a change, out of their parents, and say
that although there be a plague on both your houses, I want to
live in the one in which I want to live." 3'
As in Ohio, the legislature retreated from the "child's
choice" standard by revising Utah Code Annotated section 30-
3-5 in 1969. The revision gives the court discretion to make
equitable dispositions in custody contests.32 As a result, both
Ohio and Utah have abandoned a strict child's preference rule
in favor of one more closely aligned with the "best interests"
approach.
Appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem
Wisconsin has taken a different approach in attempting
to protect the interests of the child. Wisconsin law requires
the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the child
when there is reason for "special concern" as to the child's
future well-being.33 The statute developed from case law, and
30. Id. at 37-46, 386 P.2d at 902-08.
31. Id. at 46-49, 386 P.2d at 908-10.
32. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1976).
33. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 247.045 (West 1971) provides:
In any action for an annulment, divorce, legal separation, or otherwise
affecting, when the court has reason for special concern as to the future
welfare of the minor children, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem
to represent such children. If a guardian ad litem is appointed, the court
shall direct either or both parties to pay the fee of the guardian ad litem,
the amount of which shall be approved by the court. In the event of
[Vol. 18
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its doctrinal underpinnings are twofold. First, such appoint-
ments are considered to be within the inherent power of the
court. The inherent power doctrine finds support in the tradi-
tional power of the court to implead parties on its own motion,
and perhaps in the parens patriae power .3
Second, in the view of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, such
appointments are considered necessary because "children in-
volved in a divorce are always disadvantaged parties,
and. . .the law must take affirmative steps to protect their
welfare. '35 Thus, in Wendland v. Wendland3 1 the court strongly
recommended appointing a guardian ad litem, especially in
"hotly contested" cases where it appears that all of the evi-
dence relevant to the child's "best interests" is not likely to be
brought out by the parties or by a social welfare investigation.
Pursuant to both of the above considerations, appointments
have been directed by the supreme court.37
The advantage of this practice is that it is an effective way
to insure that the best interests of the child are considered. The
function of the guardian ad litem is to help articulate those
interests. It has been argued that the "best interests" of the
child can be better ascertained in a custody dispute if the child
has an adult advocate to speak on his behalf.3 It has been
argued, moreover, that the presence of an independent advo-
indigency on the part of both parties the court, in its discretion, may
direct that the fee of the guardian ad litem be paid by the county of
venue.
34. Hansen, supra note 3, at 181. For similar views expressed by courts in other
jurisdictions, see Zinni v. Zinni, 103 R.I. 417, 238 A.2d 373 (1968); Barth v. Barth, 12
Ohio Misc. 141, 39 Ohio Op. 2d 83, 225 N.E.2d 866 (1967). See also Berdon, supra note
3, at 155; Levin, supra note 3, at 347.
35. Kritzik v. Kritzik, 21 Wis.2d 442, 124 N.W.2d 581 (1963).
36. 29 Wis. 2d 145, 138 N.W.2d 185 (1965).
37. See Dees v. Dees, 41 Wis.2d 435, 164 N.W.2d 282 (1969); Gochenaur v.
Gochenaur, 45 Wis.2d 8, 172 N.W.2d 6 (1969). The court in Dees, per Judge Hansen,
suggested that the child was actually a party to the action.
38. See Berdon, supra note 3; Levin, supra note 3; Comment, supra note 3. The
author of the above comment complains that "when the court accepts the settlement
of the parties as binding on the child or withholds from him the safeguards afforded
parents, the child enjoys all the rights of the family car." Id. at 927. The author then
proceeds to suggest a new doctrinal strand supporting the appointment of guardians
ad litem; in a nutshell, the argument is that important interests of the child are so
critically affected at custody proceedings that to deny him representation at such
proceedings violates his right to procedural due process. This argument is well made
and is a significant contribution to the literature on the subject. However, it arguably
undervalues the interests of the parents and the state vis-a-vis custody proceedings and
fails to fully consider the child's need for emotional protection at the time of the
custody decision.
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cate can make the parents "less hostile and more realistic."' ,
Finally, the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent
the child affirms the fact that divorce-custody proceedings in-
volve the entire family. 0 Thus, the courts utilizing the guard-
ian ad litem approach would appear to avoid some of the disad-
vantages of the other methods whenever they choose to invoke
it.
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provides another
alternative to the child custody problem. Section 402 of the
Act 4' adopts the "best interests" standard; however, it makes
two slight inroads into the court's ability to exercise complete
discretion. First, before reaching its decision the court is re-
quired to consider "all relevant factors,"4" including the child's
wishes. There are no express requirements respecting the
child's age or capacity to reason, but Professor Herma Hill
Kay, one of the reporters for the drafting of the Act, maintains
that such requirements are implicit in the section.43 Second,
the court may not consider the prospective guardian's conduct
if it does not "affect his relationship to the child. ' 4  This latter
39. REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY 43 (1966).
The Governor's Commission recommended that the Wisconsin practice be adopted in
California, but their recommendation was not followed.
40. See Dees v. Dees, 41 Wis. 2d 435, 164 N.W.2d 282 (1969); Hansen, The Role
and Rights of Children in Divorce Actions, 6 J. FAM. L. 1 (1966).
41. 9 UNIF. L. ANN. § 402 provides:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest
of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors, including: (1)
the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to custody; (2) the wishes
of the child as to his custodian; (3) the interaction and interrelationship
of the child with his parent or parents, his siblings, and any other person
who may significantly affect the child's best interests; (4) the child's
adjustment to this home, school, and community; and (5) the mental and
physical health of all individuals involved. The court shall not consider
conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship to
the child.
42. Id. § 402(2).
43. Interview with Professor Herma Hill Kay, in Berkeley, Cal. (Sept. 22, 1975).
44. 9 UNIF. L. ANN. § 402. The most recent revision of the Ohio statute incorpo-
rates all but the last sentence of § 402. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.4 (Page Supp.
1976). But see Watson v. Watson, 76 Ohio L. Abs. 348, 146 N.E.2d 443 (1956). In
Watson the mother's adulterous conduct did not affect her relationship with her
daughter but nevertheless prevented her from obtaining custody. It is clear that the
trial judge believed that Mrs. Watson was a poor role model for her daughter, and the
appellate court agreed, Id. at 351, 146 N.E.2d at 446-47. Presumably this result would
have been avoided under the Uniform Act.
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rule was intended to eliminate the more flagrant and extreme
abuses of discretion possible under the traditional "best inter-
ests" approach."
The Uniform Act also permits the appointment of an at-
torney to represent the child. The appointment of such counsel
appears to be entirely within the court's discretion.4" Interest-
ingly, there are no guidelines, such as those proposed in Wend-
land or provided in the Wisconsin statute, governing the
appointment. The broad discretion given the judge under this
section reflects the reluctance of the Act's authors to allow the
child to become a party to the action, since that would increase
the danger of requiring the child to choose between his par-
ents.47
Historical Resolutions-Perspective
None of the methods of custody disposition discussed
above is without its drawbacks. This dilemma suggests that the
principles behind an "ideal" policy will reflect tensions rather
than clear-cut solutions. The following sections will identify
and discuss the interests that are at stake in a child custody
dispute and will then derive and postulate some principles that
should be considered in the future.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN CUSTODY DISPUTES
As has been noted previously, divorce involves each mem-
ber of the family. Additionally, divorce and custody-related
disputes are traditionally resolved in state courts. Thus, there
are three major groups with interests at stake in any custody
proceeding: children,48 parents, and the state. An analysis of
the interests of these often competing groups discloses the prin-
45. See Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152, cert. denied, 385
U.S. 949 (1966). Painter is summarized in note 63 infra.
46. 9 UNIF. L. ANN. § 310 provides:
The court may appoint an attorney to represent the interests of a minor
or dependent child with respect to his support, custody, and visitation.
The court shall enter an order'for costs, fees, and disbursements in favor
of the child's attorney. The order shall be made against either or both
parents, except that, if the responsible party is indigent, the costs, fees,
and disbursements shall be borne by the [appropriate agency].
47. See generally R. LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRE-
LUMINARY ANALYSIS 220 (1967).
48. For present purposes, the interests of the child embody both his wishes and
his present and future welfare, insofar as these can be determined and appear consis-
tent.
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ciples that should be at the heart of any method used in resolv-
ing custody disputes. Similarly, this analysis reveals the weak-
nesses in the existing methods of resolving custody disputes.
The Child's Interests
The interests of the child may be divided into two broad
categories: those arising at the time of the proceeding, and
those pertaining to his future. The immediate interests include
the right to be heard and protection from emotional trauma,
guilt, and conflict with either or both parents. The right to be
heard stems from modern attitudes toward children and child
rearing, and expanding views of civil rights in general. The
latter concerns result from the emotional vulnerability of chil-
dren involved in a divorce.
The child's long-run interests include minimizing future
emotional stress,4" and being provided with a stable home life.
These are obviously related to the more immediate concerns
over emotional protection, but they are more forward looking
and less easily protected by the courts.
In their four to five year study of the effects of divorce on
children, Wallerstein and Kelly found that children of all ages,
from pre-schoolers to adolescents, were subject to disruption of
their psychological development, though some children were
able to "recover" within approximately one and a half years
from parental separation. 0 In light of this study, it would seem
49. See Wallerstein & Kelly, Children and Divorce (1975) (unpublished manu-
script on file at the Social Sciences Library, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley).
50. Id. See also Wallerstein & Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experiences
of the Pre-School Child, 14 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCH. 600 (1975); Wallerstein & Kelly,
The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experiences of the Child in Early Latency, 46 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCH. 20 (1976); Wallerstein & Kelly The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experi-
ences of the Child in Later Latency, id. at 256; Wallerstein & Kelly, The Effects of
Parental Divorce: The Adolescent Experience (1975), reprinted in THE CHILD AND His
FAMILY 479-505 (C. Koupernik & C.J. Anthony eds. 1975).
Briefly, the findings of Wallerstein and Kelly may be summarized as follows: The
responses of pre-school children included irritability, whining and crying, sleep prob-
lems, and increased autoerotic activity. These children were bewildered, frightened,
confused and sad. They felt deprived, and the play of many of them was characterized
by a preoccupation with hungry animals. They tended to blame themselves for
"causing" the divorce through fantasized misdeeds and they also fantasized about the
reconciliation of their parents.
Early latency-age children (ages 7-8) often perceived the departure of the non-
custodial parent as a departure from them personally. They became depressed, lonely,
and fearful of their newly unstable family situation. They also tended to feel deprived
and at the same time guilty about "causing" the family breakdown. But most impor-
tantly for purposes of this article, they experienced a strong loyalty conflict regarding
their parents, and one child complained about being "split in two."
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that the interest in emotional protection applies to all children,
including older children perhaps only a year or two away from
leaving the home. Nevertheless, older children would seem to
have stronger reasons for being heard than do younger chil-
dren.5
The Parents' Interests
Clearly, the parents have a strong interest in having their
children raised as they (the parents) see fit. Additionally, two
Supreme Court decisions, Pierce v. Society of Sisters52 and
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 3 can be read to imply that parents have a
right to determine between themselves the nature and circum-
stances of the child's post-divorce upbringing. This right
should apply equally to each parent, though it is clear that
consistency alone provides no guidelines as to how to resolve
custody disputes.
In fact, an equal division of the responsibility of upbring-
ing is probably detrimental in that it would ignore the child's
interests and could create renewed parental disputes. In this
regard, it should be noted that the parents have an additional
interest in having a disposition with as little tension as possi-
ble, for the sake of both their own post-divorce adjustment and
their future relations with their child.
Later latency age children (ages 9-10) likewise experienced this loyalty conflict,
as well as feeling lonesome for the non-custodial parent. They also felt angry at their
parents for causing the breakdown of the family structure, were ashamed of their
parents' conduct, and some of them experienced psychosomatic symptoms. It is inter-
esting to note that none of the latency-age children felt a sense of relief about the
divorce, despite the fact that some of their pre-divorce family situations had been
anything but pleasant.
The responses of adolescents also included loyalty conflicts, but at the same time
some of them perceived their parents giving little or no consideration to their (the
children's) needs and wishes. Many of them saw their parents as fallen idols who had
betrayed them, and were angry at their parents for so doing. Another response of some
adolescents was to stay away from the home as much as possible in order to avoid the
pain and despair of facing up to the family breakdown.
Some of the children studied coped well, and many of these effects had diminished
within one year. However, in some cases the effects continued and worsened, detrimen-
tally affecting psychological development. While there does not seem to be a foolproof
way of predicting which children will cope well and which will not, Professor Waller-
stein believes that the experience during the period of legal proceedings may have a
significant impact on a child's subsequent development (telephone interview with Mrs.
Judith Wallerstein, principal investigator for the Children of Divorce Project, Matin
County, Cal., in Belvedere, Cal. (Nov. 13, 1975)).
51. The author would estimate the cutoff line at age ten. See authorities cited
notes 49 & 50 supra.
52. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
53. 406 U.S. 203 (1972).
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The State's Interest
The state has three primary interests at stake in the cus-
tody dispute. First, it has an interest in ensuring that divorces
and custody dispositions do not harm children so that they are
more likely to become well-adjusted, productive citizens. 4 Sec-
ond, as in other areas of the law, its court system has an inter-
est in avoiding congestion.55 Finally, it has an interest in pro-
viding adequate guidelines upon which its judges can make
sound decisions.
The need for sound guidelines permeates the other two
state interests. Without them, many judges simply do not have
the training or background to make informed decisions."6 In the
absence of guidelines, then, children are more likely to be
harmed by an inadequate resolution of the dispute. Similarly,
if the judge lacks the necessary expertise to resolve the dispute,
he may-and should-take the time to acquire it, though this
will undoubtedly lead to further court congestion.
Policy Considerations in Formulating Guidelines
As we have seen, custody law has not developed from well-
considered policies, but has been a haphazard evolution char-
acterized by internal inconsistencies. State policy should re-
flect rational choices based on the interests just examined. The
principles discussed here are intended as starting points for the
formulation of workable guidelines to be utilized in resolving
custody disputes.
The first principle is that the interests of each family
member are involved in a custody dispute. A law that reflects
this basic fact will be fairer, and will be more likely to effec-
tuate results which are acceptable to the parties. It follows that
the state's interest in producing well-adjusted citizens and re-
duced caseloads would also be served, since the family mem-
bers would be more satisfied with the results.57
A second principle, related to the first, is that adversary
custody hearings should proceed only after all available non-
adversary procedures have failed. Litigation should not be en-
54. Podell, The "Why" Behind Appointing Guardians Ad Litem for Children in
Divorce Proceedings, 57 MARQ. L. REv. 103, 106 (1973).
55. Comment, supra note 3, at 923-24.
56. See Mnookin, supra note 6.
57. Over one-third of all divorces involving children lead to further litigation,
most of which directly involves them. See WHEELER, supra note 1, at 72.
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couraged since an atmosphere of openness and confidence can
be better achieved in a counseling or mediation session than in
a courtroom. Furthermore, the adversary system does not facil-
itate mutually satisfactory solutions. By definition it compels
a winner and a loser, and where the stakes are the child, neither
side is apt to accept losing very easily. Finally, in court, the
child becomes an object to be won rather than a possible contri-
butor to a common solution. Even if a child does not contribute
directly to an out-of-court solution, he is better off emotionally
than he would be in a courtroom where any loyalty conflict
would become devastatingly apparent to him.58
The third principle is simply that the child's wishes must
be weighed against his need for psychological safeguards. Strict
presumptive rules prescribing the evidentiary effect of the
child's wishes and the right of the child to testify or be repre-
sented are too inflexible and arbitrary. Yet, some guidelines are
needed to suggest how a judge should proceed in various situa-
tions, since these proceedings have a significant impact on the
child's subsequent development."
A fourth principle is that the likelihood of a permanent
and stable future home life for the child should be a compelling
consideration. In line with this consideration, the custody law
should reflect a measure of flexibility in case the original dispo-
sition proves unworkable. The ideal guidelines would provide
review procedures which strike a balance between the need for
stability and the safety valve of flexibility.
The fifth principle is that it is difficult and sometimes
impossible to interpret a child's behavior. For instance, he may
not express his true feelings at a hearing to avoid hurting one
of his parents. On the 6ther hand, a momentary fit of anger
may cause a child to express a preference for one of his parents,
a choice he may later regret. If the parents are in agreement,
the child may vigorously oppose them as a way of venting anger
at them for breaking up the home. Since the parents, investi-
58. Bodenheimer, The Rights of Children and the Crisis in Custody Litigation:
Modification in and out of State, 46 U. COLO. L. REv. 495, 506-07 (1975). Bodenheimer
stated:
The only way I can see to give the child full protection [in custody cases]
is to assist parties to come to grips with their feelings and with the
realities of divorce insofar as the children are concerned. This must be
done in a different setting, in a non-adversary atmosphere.
59. Telephone interview with Mrs. Judith Wallerstein, principal investigator for
the Children of Divorce Project, Matin County, Cal., in Belvedere, Cal. (Nov. 13,
1975).
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gating social worker, psychologist, and judge are involved in
the proceeding, each may play a part in interpreting the child's
behavior. Proper guidelines would resolve the question of who
is best qualified to interpret the child's behavior.
The final principle is that, absent physical or mental inca-
pacity, each parent should have an equal right to custody. This
principle is a corollary to the first principle that the interests
of each family member should be given equal consideration.
While it seems to be contrary to the need for judicial guide-
lines, it actually emphasizes the need for non-arbitrary guide-
lines. Moreover, it recognizes that each parent usually has a
strong emotional attachment to the child and each has a con-
stitutionally protected interest in the child's upbringing.'" Fi-
nally, it removes any legal preference that may tend to make
the preferred parent more court-oriented and less conciliatory,
thus infringing on all other interests.
A Critical Look at Existing Solutions
Having identified the interests involved in a custody pro-
ceeding and derived a set of principles to be applied in evaluat-
ing child custody legislation, it becomes relevant to critically
examine the current methods of resolving custody disputes in
light of the preceding discussion.
The "best interests" standard. Though the "best inter-
ests" standard has come under fire recently,6 there are some
good arguments in its favor. It places the ultimate responsibil-
ity for the decision on the judge, thus reducing the child's role
and his concomitant anxiety. It also enables the judge, within
his discretion, to consider the interest§ of all family members.
Finally, it is flexible in that it allows the judge to consider the
unique circumstances of each case, albeit only to the extent
that he sees fit.
On the other hand, this method has serious drawbacks. Ashas been suggested, the phrase "best interests" is overly broad.
It is too often a "legal clich6" which may be used to justify
almost any outcome.6" Moreover, it leaves a child's future en-
tirely up to the trial judge. Appellate courts rarely second guess
60. This equal protection argument has been recognized by the legislatures ofFlorida, Oregon, and Wisconsin. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b) (West 1971); OR.
REV. STAT. § 1 0 7 .105(1)(a) (1971); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 247.24(3) (West 1976).
61. See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD (1973).
62. See M. WHEELER, supra note 1, at 76.
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custody dispositions based on the "best interests" standard. 3
Finally, because it is so vague, the "best interests" standard
probably encourages protracted litigation involving the child.
The maternal presumption. Like the best interests stan-
dard, the maternal presumption keeps the child somewhat in-
sulated from the "combat zone." There are two other advan-
tages to the maternal presumption. First, the rule might not be
so arbitrary as one might think. It has been suggested that the
father's traditional social role, male skills, and time commit-
ment to his livelihood make him a less desirable custodian than
the mother.64 So perhaps it is not simply a matter of the mother
being a "natural guardian" or evoking the "atmosphere of
heaven" in the minds of judges; the maternal presumption
may, after all, reflect a practical view of the realities of family
life. Second, it may be argued that the maternal presumption
actually discourages vindictive husbands from litigating since
they are more likely to lose.
Nevertheless, the drawbacks of the maternal presumption
would seem to outweigh its possible advantages. Initially, its
requirement of a showing of unfitness tends to increase adver-
sary litigation and risks exposing the already vulnerable child
to more emotional stress. Moreover, if mothers really are better
custodians, as some commentators suggest, then they do not
need the benefit of a legal preference to obtain custody. The
preference itself reflects sexual and social roles that are cur-
rently under fire. Similarly, it fails to allow for a consideration
of the unique circumstances of each case. Finally, by offering
mothers desirous of custody no incentive to come to private
agreements, the maternal presumption fails to encourage the
use of non-adversary procedures.
The child's choice rule. Despite its apparent harshness in
some cases, two arguments may be made in favor of the child's
63. To make matters worse, when appellate courts do get involved they often
reveal that they are subject to similar judgmental limitations, and subjective value
judgments are the inevitable result. In Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d
152 (1966), a "stable, dependable, conventional, middleclass, middlewest home" was
preferred over an "unstable, unconventional, arty, Bohemian, and probably intellec-
tually stimulating" environment. Id. at 1393-96, 140 N.W.2d at 154-56. Whatever one
thinks of Bohemianism as opposed to conventionality, it is clear that the value judg-
ments made in Painter required no legal training, as the Painter court itself recognized.
Viewed in this light, the policy of leaving such decisions up to judges is open to
question.
64. See generally W. Goode, AFrER DIVORCE (1956), cited in R. LEvy, supra note
47, at 225.
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choice rule. First, given that the child's best interests cannot
be easily ascertained, it follows that the child's feelings and
values are at least as good as anyone else's.6 s The child is in no
worse a position to decide than the parents, who have been
unable to make their marriage work, or the judge, whose short-
comings in this regard have already been discussed. Second,
the child should be treated as a person, and the best way to
achieve that is to let him speak his mind. As Chief Justice
Henriod argued in Smith, children ten and over have "pretty
good sense" and they are likely to be aware of what is at stake
regarding their future. Therefore, they will not be inclined to
take the decision lightly.
Ultimately, however, the weaknesses of the child's choicepresumption outweigh its advantages. The foregoing discussion
makes it clear that solutions should seek to avoid increasing the
child's emotional trauma. Having the child make the determi-
nation would only aggravate these difficulties. Moreover, most
parents are not all that bad, as Justice Traynor suggested in
In re Guardianship of Smith.66 Additionally, such a rule could
go too far; one logical extension of the child's choice rule would
empower the child to contest the divorce which could have
disastrous results.6 7
A problem related to the child's choice rule is finding stan-
dards that enable the courts to determine whether a child is
capable of making the decision. It has been argued that instead
of relying on arbitrary age criteria, judges should consider the
child's mental capacity, intelligence, and maturity. In this
fashion the judge could be reasonably sure of the child's ability
65. It is not uncommon for children to express a clear preference for one parent
over the other during custody proceedings. See, e.g., Lamb v. Lamb, 230 Ga. 532, 198S.E.2d 171 (1973); Pritchett v. Pritchett, 219 Ga. 635, 135 S.E.2d 417 (1964); Smith v.Smith, 15 Utah 2d 36, 386 P.2d 900 (1963); Watson v. Watson, 76 Ohio L. Abs. 348,146 N.E.2d 443 (1956). This could indicate that many children are able to deal with
loyalty conflict or suppress it sufficiently to make a choice.
66. 42 Cal.2d 91, 94, 265 P.2d.888, 891 (1954).
67. This has been suggested, apparently in all seriousness, by a Michigan judge.See M. WHEELER, supra note 1, at 84-85.
It should also be pointed out that the child's choice rule makes it possible for a
child originally awarded to one parent to run away to the home of the other parent
and bring about further litigation in the form of a modification suit brought by the
chosen parent. This happened in Lamb v. Lamb, 230 Ga. 532, 198 S.E.2d 171 (1973),
wherein the son left his father's home and went to live with his mother upon reaching
the age of fourteen. The mother petitioned for modification. The result was that, in
addition to the fourteen-year-old's choice being respected, the mother regained custody
of the boy's eight-year-old brother. The court reasoned that it was in the latter's best
interests for him to remain with his older brother.
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to make an informed decision before letting him make it. Yet
there are a number of difficulties with using these criteria.
First, neither judges nor investigating social workers are ex-
perts on child development. Any conclusions as to the child's
ability to choose will be colored to a certain extent by what the
judge or social worker believes is in the child's best interests.
Second, even experts point out that terms like "intelligence"
and "maturity" cannot be defined narrowly, and therefore can
be interpreted in different ways. Finally, the psychological
data itself is subject to varying interpretations. Thus, there is
little or nothing to be gained by sustituting a mental capacity
test for the age standard."8
Appointment of a guardian ad litem. Several arguments
may be made in favor of the Wisconsin practice of allowing the
appointment of guardians ad litem. Initially, it recognizes that
divorce involves the entire family by providing an attorney for
the child and making him a party to the action. Further, the
presence of a guardian can have a soothing effect on the parents
and focus their attention on the welfare of the child. Similarly,
a conscientious guardian can also assist the child in his under-
standing of his own needs and aid in his emotional adjustment.
Finally, the guardian's presence may increase the likelihood of
finding a good home for the child, which in turn serves the
interests of both the child and the state by reducing the
chances of future delinquency. 9
The primary shortcoming of the Wisconsin approach is
that it places too much emphasis on the child's "rights" and
not enough on his emotional vulnerability. A child is placed in
an extremely difficult position when forced to state a parental
preference in open court. Neither protection of the child's sup-
posed "rights" nor any notion of conceptual consistency justify
the risks. In addition, a nonconscientious guardian could make
the disposition process more acrimonious by failing to perceive
the needs of all the parties. Finally, lawyers generally are not
trained to work with children in the manner contemplated by
the Wisconsin statute. On the whole, then, the presence of a
guardian ad litem is more likely to excerbate emotional diffi-
culties rather than ameliorate them.
In summary, it seems clear that none of the current meth-
68. See Ellsworth, Review of the Psychological Literature Relevant to Custody
Litigation, in LEVY, supra note 47, at 1-20, 1-21.
69. See Podell, supra note 54, at 106.
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ods available to resolve custody disputes has taken into consid-
eration all of the six basic principles outlined earlier. In fact,
each method tends to emphasize one or perhaps two of the
principles at the expense of the others. In this fashion the
methods provide inadequate guidelines for workable disposi-
tions. Consequently, an alternative is needed that begins with
the premise that all six basic principles are worthy of attention
and should be accomodated.
MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION: A MODEL STATUTE
The following proposed mediation-arbitration statute is
offered as a workable method of resolving custody disputes.
Though not without its problems, it nevertheless embodies all
of the aforementioned principles:
§ 1. No divorce shall be granted without the parents of
children ten (10) years of age and over, and such children,
having either:
a) arrived at a family agreement bearing the en-
dorsement of a counselor from the Department of
Social Welfare, 0 or
b) participated in a Family Counseling Program
consisting of bimonthly meetings with the same
counselor for a maximum of six months' or until a
family agreement is reached and receives the coun-
selor's endorsement, in which case it shall become
binding upon the court.
Children five (5) years of age and younger may not partici-
pate in family meetings; children between five and ten
years of age may participate if both parents agree to such
participation. If the parents do not agree to their partici-
pation, children between the ages of five and ten may not
participate.
§2. a) If a family agreement is not reached within the
period of time specified in §1(b), the question of custody
shall be decided by a three-member Arbitration Panel.
Each parent shall choose one member of the Panel, and
third member shall be chosen by the other two members.
70. In California, this function may be fulfilled by a conciliation court. See note
73 infra.
71. This figure represents the number of months between the filing of a divorce
action and the interlocutory hearing in California.
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Those eligible to be Panel members include the family
doctor or pediatrician, a clergyman from the family's
church or synagogue, a teacher knowing one or more of the
children, and any other adult who knows the child or chil-
dren well enough to make an informed decision respecting,
insofar as is practicable, their wishes and welfare. The
counselor who was present at the family counseling meet-
ing shall file a report including recommendations as to
custody, and such report shall be considered by the Panel
but shall not be controlling. Such arbitration shall be
binding on the family and may not be reviewed for six
months from the date the child commences living with the
custodian chosen by the Panel.
b) The decision of the Arbitration Panel may be
challenged as follows:
1) by appealing to the Panel no less than six months
after the child commences living with the custodian
originally selected by the Panel;
2) by appealing to the Family or Superior Court
after having received an unfavorable decision from
the Panel's review of its original decision. When the
jurisdiction of the court is invoked there shall be a
presumption in favor of the Panel's most recent deci-
sion. The challenging party must overcome the pre-
sumption by clear and convincing evidence. If the
challenging party overcomes the presumption and
wins a favorable determination from the court, the
Panel's decision is considered a nullity, and custody
will be awarded to the challenging party.
Only a parent or a third party having a reasonable claim
to custody may challenge a ruling of the Panel. A claim
that one is the custodial choice of a child is not, in and of
itself, a claim on which to base such a challenge.
§3. If the parents are able to work out an arrangement
for the sharing of legal (but not physical) custody, they
may do so and such arrangement shall be enforceable once
endorsed by a counselor from the Department of Social
Welfare.
§4. a) There shall be periodic review of all custodial ar-
rangements. The appropriate counselor shall review all
family agreements and all final unchallenged dispositions
made by an Arbitration Panel on a yearly basis for the first
three years after they become effective, and every two
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years thereafter until the child reaches majority.
b) A family agreement or Panel disposition shall be-
come effective as of the date of the divorce decree or, if the
agreement is reached prior to the pendente lite hearing, it
shall become effective as of the date of said hearing.
The mediation program is a forward-looking version of the
conciliation services presently provided by courts in various
localities. The conciliation procedure is intended to prevent the
breakup of the family while mediation attempts to resolve dis-
puted issues between members of a family that has already
dissolved. Additionally, the statute's requirement of mediation
as a first step supports the principle of consulting all family
members and is designed to interpose a "cooling off" period
during which the parents can reflect on the prospects of going
to court. Such a cooling off period would increase the likelihood
of an out of court agreement."
The purpose of requiring the counselor's endorsement is to
ensure that the child is at least consulted even in cases where
the parents agree on the custody issue. In cases of parental
disagreement, the counselor's role is to facilitate a settlement.
In either case, it is beneficial to the child to be heard in a
conciliatory, non-adversary setting.
While generally encouraging family participation, the pro-
posal also provides that children age ten or older are entitled
to participate in the proceedings. The underlying assumption
is that older children are aware of what is at stake and are
probably somewhat less emotionally vulnerable than younger
children. Children age five and under are excluded from partic-
ipating since they probably have no clear concept of the pro-
ceedings and are more vulnerable than older children. Children
between the ages of five and ten may or may not understand
the consequences or be emotionally stable enough to warrant
their participation. If both parents agree, the five to ten year
old may participate. This provision seeks to avoid parent-child
conflict at the conference while still leaving open the possibility
of the child's participation. It is submitted that if the parents
72. See Marschall & Gatz, The Custody Decision Process: Toward New Roles for
Parents and the State, 7 N.C. CENT. L. REv. 50 (1975). The authors argue that the
proper role for the state in custody cases is to facilitate negotiations between the
parents rather than to impose a solution on them. For their proposal of compulsory
mediation, see id. at 62-65. See also note 58 supra.
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are unable to agree upon the issue of the child's participation
it is likely that there would be serious conflict at the meetings.
To avoid unproductive meetings that are more likely to
increase conflict, the proposed statute places a time limit on
its mediation process.73 If the parents are unable to reach an
agreement in the time specified, the meetings are terminated.
On the other hand, an agreement reached within the time limit
will become binding, if the counselor gives his endorsement.
Thus, in the event of an agreement, a counselor rather than a
judge ratifies the custody disposition. The underlying rationale
is that a counselor is more qualified to make such a determina-
tion. Admittedly, a counselor may be prone to the same biases
and prejudices as a judge, but the use of a counselor is a less
onerous alternative."
Cases that are not disposed of through mediation are put
into an arbitration proceeding. Arbitration is an informal ad-
versary proceeding with several advantages over court hear-
ings.7" Because of its informal nature, it probably induces less
73. Marschall & Gatz suggest a 60-day limit for the mediation process, in the
interest of avoiding uncertainty for the child. See Marschall & Gatz, supra note 72.
74. Custody counseling is actually being done in Alameda County, Cal.,. under
the auspices of the Conciliation Court. Bodenheimer, supra note 58, at 507. The coun-
seling program is voluntary and is being offered pursuant to California's Conciliation
Court Law. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1730-1748 (West 1972 & Supp. 1978). One purpose
of this law is to provide a means for "the amicable settlement of domestic and family
controversies." Id. § 1730. Elizabeth O'Neill, Director of the Conciliation Court, re-
ports that some form of conciliation counseling takes place in roughly 25% of the
dissolution cases filed in Alameda County. Many of the cases in which custody is in
dispute are resolved after two to three weekly sessions. Interview with Elizabeth
O'Neill, in Oakland, Cal. (Oct. 16, 1977). It may not be a coincidence that in Alameda
County the time between the filing of a dissolution case and the pendente lite hearing
at which the question of custody may first be considered is approximately 3 weeks.
In addition, Connecticut requires that couples seeking to obtain a divorce spend
two sessions with a conciliation counselor in order to "explore the possibility of recon-
ciliation or of resolving the emotional problems which might lead to continuing con-
flicts following the dissolution of the marriage." Some of these "emotional problems"
could conceivably be related to child custody, so it is possible that, at least in some
cases, Connecticut parents are participating in custody mediation, albeit only to the
extent of two sessions. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-41 (West Supp. 1978).
75. Arbitration was first proposed as a solution in 1964. Kubie, Provisions for the
Care of Children of Divorced Parents: A New Legal Instrument, 73 YALE L.J. 1197
(1964). Arbitration has been adopted in at least one county in Maryland where it has
apparently been working well. New York courts also allow custody disputes to be
resolved by arbitration, but they also reserve the right to deny effect to the arbitrator's
decision if they find that such decision does not serve the "best interests" of the child.
Sheets v. Sheets, 22 App. Div.2d 176, 254 N.Y.S. 320 (1964). See generally Coulson,
Family Arbitration: An Exercise in Sensitivity, 3 FAM. L.Q. 22 (1969); Holman &
Noland, Agreement and Arbitration: Relief to Over-litigation in Domestic Disputes in
Washington, 12 WILLAMETE L.J. 527 (1976).
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tension than regular courtroom proceedings. Arbitration also
eliminates much of the time and expense involved in court
proceedings and reduces court congestion. Inasmuch as the
panel of arbitrators consists of family acquaintances they are
likely to be familiar with the needs and abilities of each mem-
ber.76 Indeed, one author has argued that such a panel forces
the parents to think of their children's needs by acting as an
"externalized conscience." 77
There are admittedly some problems with the arbitration
plan. Most notably, it is an adversary proceeding without the
protections afforded by the rules of evidence. The possibility of
intimidation and other abuses is increased. Furthermore, it is
unknown whether arbitration can be implemented on a large
scale. Most arbitrators are not trained counselors or social
workers and are therefore subject to the same frustrations expe-
rienced by judges. Additionally, arbitrators do not receive
much compensation. Unless some profound changes are made
in the qualifications and compensation of arbitrators it will be
difficult to implement the proposal."
Despite these problems, arbitration has been stressed as
a viable alternative to a regular court-custody hearing and
has been successfully implemented in at least one county in
Maryland. While it manifests certain risks it is probably less
harmful to the child than courtroom proceedings.
The proposed statute sets forth a procedure for appealing
a decision of the arbitration panel. A party must wait six
months before challenging the decision. Arguably, six months
is sufficient time in which to ascertain whether the disposition
is stable and in the child's best interest. If the arrangement is
not working, a longer period would aggravate the situation.
Another advantage is that the waiting period establishes a tem-
76. The model statute's provision for the selection of panel members is precisely
that suggested by Kubie, supra note 73.
77. Id.
78. This last point is particularly telling in light of the panel's continuing
"jurisdiction" under the statute. Alternatives might include compulsory arbitration
with trained counselors (social workers) serving as arbitrators, or referral to local
domestic relations councils. The former alternative would seem to approach court
adjudication in its impersonality, while implementation of the latter, unfortunately,
appears to be a long way off at this point in time.
79. Kubie proposed that the child have a confidential "adult ally." Kubie, supra
note 73, at 1199. Such a person might have a role to play in interpreting the child's
behavior, but otherwise the "adult ally" appears to be analogous to a guardian ad
litem, embodying all the benefits and drawbacks of the Wisconsin practice.
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porary status quo which may dissuade a potential challenger.
The first forum of review is the panel. This provision has the
effect of discouraging appeal as it is unlikely that the panel
would reverse its earlier decision absent a strong showing of
changed circumstances or necessity. Should the appeal reach
the stage of court adjudication, the appellant must overcome
the presumption in favor of the original disposition by clear
and convincing evidence. The reason for the difficult standard
is to discourage litigation. Repeated court battles or custody
fights could cause a child to suffer severe emotional damage,
defeating the proposed statute's focus on the child's well-being.
The provision for periodic review of all custodial arrangements
also should reduce reliance on litigation. Any party having a
claim for custody who is unhappy with either the panel's or the
court's disposition need only await the review session with the
counselor.
Finally, the purpose of the shared legal custody provision
is to encourage parents who are so inclined to cooperate in
deciding how the child will be raised. The provision would have
the effect of facilitating good relationships between the child
and both parents. However, alternating physical custody be-
yond normal visitation rights is disapproved since it would
undermine the objective of stability. In addition, all such ar-
rangements require a counselor's endorsement and subsequent
review to prevent magnified conflict over how the child should
be raised.
CONCLUSION
Historically, the best interests standard has been applied
most frequently by courts to settle custody disputes.1s Despite
all of its problems, it does promote psychological protection by
placing the ultimate responsibility for the custody decision on
the judge, not the child. However, as noted previously, trial
judges are often ill-equipped to handle custody decisions in-
volving intricate familial relationships. Similarly, the best in-
terests approach simply ignores some of the five basic princi-
ples that should be at the heart of any custody disposition.
80. Other possible standards are ably discussed in Mnookin, supra note 6. They
include a preference for the richer parent, a preference for the parent willing to spend
more time with the child, and an arbitrary coin flip. An examination of these stan-
dards, engaging though it may be, would add little to the discussion of the primary
question herein, namely the treatment of the child at the time of the disposition.
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The proposed method of mediation and arbitration at-
tempts to accommodate all of these principles. Its emphasis
on conciliation satisfies the principle of consulting all family
members. Further, its elaborate mediation procedure satisfies
the second principle by forestalling an adversary confrontation
and interposing a cooling off period. By avoiding litigation,
unless conciliation, mediation, and arbitration have all failed,
the proposed statute contains many built-in psychological safe-
guards for the child, in line with the third principle.
With its flexible and continuing review procedures of cus-
tody decisions made by the panel or the court, the proposed
statute places great emphasis on the fourth principle-a stable
future home life for the children. Finally, by providing for cus-
tody decisions made by people intimately familiar with the
family relationships, the mediation-arbitration procedure goes
a long way towards satisfying the fifth principle-accurate in-
terpretation of the child's behavior. Finally, the proposed
method avoids sex-based preferences and thus embodies the
sixth principle.
Perhaps the greateot attribute of the proposed method for
resolving custody disputes is its recognition that it is difficult
if not impossible to predict the child's long term "best inter-
ests."'" As a result, any custody disposition should be contin-
ually monitored. This factor is built into the proposed system.
The commitment to this goal of constant monitoring will tend
to humanize custody dispositions for the benefit of everyone
involved.
81. See generally id.
[Vol. 18
